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HOW DISTURBED WAS HUME
BY HIS OWN
SKEPTICISM?

M. A. Box

When a writer is skilful in destructive criticism, the
public is satisfied with that. If he has no constructive
philosophy, it is not demanded; and if he has, it is
overlooked.
-----T. S. Eliot, "The Humanism of Irving
Babbitt “

In the mind of a Hume one can watch at one's ease
this superhuman balance of contrasting opposites—the
questions of so profound a moment, the answers of so
supreme a calm. And the same beautiful quality may
be traced in the current of his life, in which the
wisdom of philosophy so triumphantly interpenetrated
the vicissitudes of the mortal lot.
---- Lytton Strachey, "Hume"
Pleas for moderation are disadvantaged in that they lack
excitement. Nevertheless, they are often what the situation
calls for. As everyone knows, David Hume maintained that
reason cannot answer a number of questions many people have
deemed rather pressing. Though many have tried to answer
these questions, no consensus exists that anyone has succeeded,
and so Hume is best known to us as the great skeptic who
deflated philosophical optimism and fomented Counter-En
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lightenment irrationalism and modernist angst. The present
question is just how disturbed Hume was by these skeptical
doubts. The answer will be that, notwithstanding the reaction
of posterity, he was not nearly so disturbed himself as is often
supposed.
Presently among literary scholars, if decreasingly among
philosophers, the prevailing image of Hume seems to be that
he was cut to the quick by his own skeptical arguments. Most
of the indications from his writings and biography are that
Hume was a fairly well-balanced and happy man, but often this
awkward fact is ignored, with the implicit explanation that so
disturbed was he that he suppressed his doubts, suffering from
"solipsistic fear,” "literary loneliness,” and other dreadful
sounding psycho-pathological conditions.1 According to this
view, Hume wished to be a constructive empiricist but was
actually a Pyrrhonist malgrelut. Although there is truth in this
picture of Hume, 1 suggest that the picture is an exaggeration,
much as distoning as if in describing Samuel Johnson’s charac
ter we focused disproportionately on his fear of death and
damnation.
Perhaps we are so accustomed to exploring the inner storms
and stresses of writers that out of inertia we approach Hume
likewise. True, there is good reason to believe that Hume did
not rejoice in his skepticism. All the same, we would be hard
put to find a more well-adjusted and sane genius. His skep
ticism appears in many forms and degrees, but the only form
that can be said to nave disturbed him appreciably is the
dubiety of reason's efficacy in view of its dependence on
certain unverifiable premises. We get startlingly different
pictures of Hume if we compare two passages—one from the
Treatise (London: 1739—40), the other from the Enquiry con-

1 These diagnoses come, respectively. from A D Nuttall, A Common Sky
PhiLosophy and the Literary Imagination (Berkeley University of California Press,
1974). 11, 92-111, where we find Hume prefiguring Romanticism and Paterian
aestheticism. and John Sitter. Literary Loneliness in Mid Eighteenth-Century England
(Ithaca
Cornell University Preu, 1982), 19—49, 219-29. Examples could be
multiplied In Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth
Century (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), John Mullan repeats the gloomy skepticism
theme, speaking of the "dark fatalism of Hume's epistemological enquiry" (21).
Mark A. Wollaeger says that Hume's skepticism caused "a necessary repression of
the intolerable" that sends him into society for solace, establishing a pattern
implicit with a "theory of repression" that Conrad would render in fiction and
Freud would articulate Joseph Conrad and the Fictions of Skepticism |Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1990], 112, 78).
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cerning Human Understanding— in which he reacted to the
dubiety of reason. In the Treatise he says, in uncharacteristic
ally febrile prose,

The intense view of these manifold contradictions and
imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me,
and heated my brain, that 1 am ready to reject all belief
and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as
more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or
what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and
to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I
court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings
surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or
who have any influence on me? I am confounded with
all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most
deplorable condition imaginable, inviron'd with the
deepest darkness, and utterly depriv'd of the use of every
member and faculty. (I. iv. 7 / 268-9)2
Rampant reason—that is, reason unchecked by nature—shortcircuits itself in its Pyrrhonian permutation, and results not, as
the Pyrrhonists held, in ataraxic tranquility, but in debilitating
dithering. Speaking in the Enquiry of the same topic, however,
Hume makes light of such skepticism, telling us that this
debilitating dithering is nothing to worry about. When a
Pyrrhonist

awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the
laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objec
tions are mere amusement, and can have no other
tendency than to show the whimsical condition of
mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though
they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to
satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these

2 References to the Treatise (hereinafter abbreviated in citations as THN) will
normally be to book, pan, and section numbers, followed by a virgule and page
numbers from A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., rev. P.
H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978).
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operations, or to remove the objections, which may be
raised against them. (xii. 2 / 160)3

Which was the real Hume, the weeping or the laughing
philosopher? Doubtless he was neither and he was both. He
was a real person, and real people are complicated, evincing
contradictory tendencies; otherwise they would not be the jest
and riddle as well as the glory of the world. But if we were to
choose which of the two he was preponderantly, we should
conclude that he resembled Democritus more than he did
Heraclitus. It rings true when Robert Adam’s mother calls
Hume “the Large Jolly Man” and “the most agreable Facetious
Man” she ever met.4 Usually he was more inclined to laugh
at than lament the feeble powers of man, with the added
endearment that foremost in risibility for Hume was the
philosopher and, therefore, Hume himself. The defeat of
reason and mortification of philosophy is not disastrous if the
victor is nature.
O

O

O

O

O

O

O

The present question is one of biographical fact as much as of
philosophy, But either way one views it Hume emerges as a
tolerably nappy man. Let us start with biographical fact. We
are fortunate in that we know a great deal about his life.
Three volumes’ worth of letters and a great deal of testimony
about him survive to us. Someone reading the letters in their
entirety gets fairly well acquainted with the man, and one does
not come away with an impression of so much as a hint of
suppressed anxiety in him. When on occasion he was anxious
or upset, as he was over his trouble with Rousseau, he general
ly let all of his friends know in tiresome detail what the matter
was. There is almost no sign in the letters of worry over the
force of skepticism. Examining his letters, we learn what
really bothered him: the national debt; attacks on his moral

3 References to what is now commonly called the first Enquiry (hereinafter
abbreviated in citations as EHU) will be to section and pan numbers, followed by
a virgule and page numbers from Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and
concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed., rev. P. H.
Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975). Originally it was published as Philosophical
Essays concerning Human Understanding (London: 1748).
4 Quoted in Alexander Carlyle, Anecdotes and Characters of the Times, ed. James
Kinsley (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 139 (A. D. 1753).
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character such as Rousseau’s; captious receptions to his books,
particularly the reception of the first volumes of his History;
English arrogance towards Scots; and Wilkite agitations, which
he feared would provoke a reaction against free expression. If
any issue in intellectual life distressed Hume, it was more the
“Whig interpretation of history” than skepticism.5 By and
large, the letters bear out Hume's description of himself in his
autobiography as “being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine
Temper.”6
In only one letter, admittedly a remarkable and justifiably
much-quoted one, is Hume's distress related to philosophy.
This is the letter of 1734 addressed perhaps to Dr. George
Cheyne, perhaps to Dr. Arbuthnot, perhaps never sent, m
which Hume described at length the psychosomatic ailments he
suffered in his late teens and early twenties.7 So much has this
letter been discussed that it rias informally acquired the
convenient name of Hume's Letter to a Physician. By itself
the Letter yields no evidence of skepticism's having bothered
Hume. Only in conjunction with section 7 of book 1, part 4
of the Treatise does the Letter suggest such a thing. The two
do invite juxtaposition, however.
Before proceeding to examine the Letter in conjunction with
the pertinent sections of the Treatise, we should note that only
in these two places in his whole oeuvre will we find indications
that skepticism troubled Hume. And here we find that the
particular skeptical question troubling Hume was the dubiety
of reason.
Elsewhere Hume skeptically challenged every
argument he could find supporting supernaturalist religion and
the tenet that morality is an objective feature of the cosmos
rather than a system of conventions derived from our subjec
tive responses to events. But there is no indication that
skepticism regarding these topics bothered him in the least.
The possibilities that God is not in his heaven and that
morality is not objectively fixed may have horrified Pascal and

5 See Victor G. Wexler, David Hume and the History of England. Memorials of the
American Philosophical Society 131 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society,
1979).
6 "My Own Life" ms., rpt. in The Letters of David Hume ed. J. Y. T. Greig. 2
vols. (Oxford: Clarendon. 1932), I: 2. Hereinafter the Letters will be ab
breviated in citations as LDH.
7 See [Mar. or Apr. 1734,) LDH, I: 12-18, and, for background, Ernest Campbel)
Mossner, "Hume's Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, 1734: the Biographical Significance,"
Huntington Library Quarterly 7 (1944): 135-52.
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T. S. Eliot, but not Hume. The question of personal identity
is often thought to have disturbed Hume, but recent interpreta
tions of his theory indicate that he was simply attacking
Cartesian tenets concerning identity, not lamenting the dis
covery that he had no self.8 His indecision between naive
realism, representative realism, and skeptical impasse appears in
his writings only as illustration of natural limitations on our
ratiocinative capabilities, so the problem of external reality
resolves itself into the larger one of the dubiety of reason’s
efficacy. The same is true of the discussions of induction and
causal connection. The only skeptical topic that disturbed
Hume was the dubiety of reason’s efficacy; and the only places
in which Hume represented that question as disturbing, in an
oeuvre so voluminous that he professed himself almost "a
shamed to see his own bulk upon a Shelf,"9 are the last section
of book 1 of the Treatise and, by implication, the Letter to a
Physician.
Understandably but unfortunately, this portion of the
Treatise has unduly dominated our view of Hume. One
prominent book will have to suffice for illustration. A good
nook emphasizing the distress caused Hume by the challenge
of skepticism is John Sitter’s Literary Loneliness in Mid-Eight

8 For example, Philip Mercer, Sympathy and Ethics A Study of the Relationship
between Sympathy and Morality with Special Reference to Hume's ‘‘Treatise" (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1972), 30, J L Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory (London Routledge,
1980), 159-&D n), Don Garren, “Hume's Self-Doubts about Personal Identity"
Philosophical Review 90 (1981): 357-58. At a commentator for the session, “Recent
Books on Hume: The Suasive Art of David Hume" (18th annual conference of
the Hume Society, University of Oregon, Eugene, July 1991), Richard Walton
adduced Hume's theoretical difficulties with personal identity as indicating a rritr
Pyrrhonienne This was by way of showing now in my book 1 had underplayed
Hume's skepticism To be brief, in the Treatise Hume premises hit passional
psychology, and thereby also hit sentimentalist moral theory, on our having a
sense of self (II, 11 / 317). so plainly he saw as compatible with a sane, moral
life the tenet that the self is a succession of perceptions connected causally. The
problem he candidly identifies in the appendix is that he cannot account for how
the successive perceptions acquire their impressions of causal connection to each
other. Somehow the mind bundles its perceptions and pulls itself together, so to
speak. Of this he has no doubt, though the mechanism eludes him; "Others,
perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflection, may discover some hypothesis"
that will explain the process (636). One must contrive to read such a hopeful
conclusion ironically to make it compatible with Pyrrhonism, and due caution
requires us to consider that, though a consummate ironist, sometimes Hume
simply meant what he said.
9 Quoted in Private Papers of James Boswell from Malahide Cattle, in the Collection
of Lt. Colonel Ralph Hryward Isham, ed. Geoffrey Scott and Frederick Pottle. 18
vols. ([New York:) privately printed, 1928-34), I: 129.
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eenth-Century England, winner of the 1983 Louis Gottschalk
Prize. Not the least of the strengths of this book is that Sitter
draws attention to possible weaknesses in his own case. In
arguing that trouble in establishing a basis for rational belief
resulted in Hume’s literary loneliness in the Treatise, from
which Hume fled in subsequent works to less solipsistically
slippery slopes and more publicly verifiable phenomena, Sitter
admits that instances of Hume’s oven distress are not common,
even in the Treatise: "It must be conceded at once...that these
melodramatic moments are not entirely typical and that we
have been concentrating on the more conspicuously autobio
graphical sections and ignoring most of the book.” Nevertheless
Sitter finds it significant, in view of the atypical moment of
neo-Pyrrhonian consternation, that the “silent solitude of
Hume’s chamber is one of the more vivid 'impressions’
throughout the Treatise," and he asserts, in patent exaggeration,
that the "chamber and the moment are the boundaries of
Hume’s experience as a writer.” Whereas, according to Sitter,
the literary world of Locke’s Essay is the “clubbable” conversa
tion of the friends Locke mentioned in his introductory epistle,
the world of the Treatise is that of a man meditating in
isolation from any auditors.10 But Hume’s references to his
chamber cease when he leaves book 1 of the Treatise, in which,
after all, he was expounding an empiricist account of percep
tion by way of establishing his laws of mind. Surely the
nature of the endeavor is sufficient to explain Hume’s practice
of illustrating points with references to his own perceptual
world. These illustrations are reported dispassionately and, by
themselves, do not suggest loneliness.
It is only in light of the histrionics at the end of book 1 and
of the distress recorded in the Letter to a Physician that these
illustrations might suggest a sense of isolation, and we should
balance this picture by reviewing some biographical facts that
are frequently ignored. From a letter of 1735 we know that in
La Fleche, where Hume composed much of the Treatise, his
practice was to spend more than half of his day in study.11 On

10 Literary Loneliness, 30, 23-4. As a matter of biographical fact, Hume was by
universal report exceedingly clubbable and gregarious. See, for example, Carlyle,
Anecdotes, 141 et passim, and Mossner, Life of David Hume, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1980), ch. 21.
11 Ernest C. Mossner, “Hume at La Fleche, 1735: An Unpublished Letter," Texas
Studies in English 37 (1958): 32.
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the other hand, Hume's argument against the credibility of
testimony concerning miracles, originally included in the
Treatise, was horn not of solitary meditation, but of a conver
sation As Hume informed George Campbell,
I was walking in the cloisters of the Jesuits' College of La
Fleche... and engaged in a conversation with a Jesuit of
some parts and learning, who was relating to me, and
urging some nonsensical miracle performed in their
convent, when I was tempted to dispute against him;
and as my head was full of the topics of my Treatise of
Human Nature, which I was at that time composing, this
argument immediately occurred to me, and I thought it
very much gravelled my companion; but at last he
observed to me, that it was impossible for that argument
to have any solidity, because it operated equally against
the Gospel as the Catholic miracles;—which observation
[ thought proper to admit as a sufficient answer. (LDH,
1: 361)

The world of the Treatise looks here less like a solipsistic
soliloquy in an isolated chamber than a congenial contest of
wits. We know that before going to La Fleche Hume stayed
in Paris with the Chevalier Ramsay, whose persistence in
challenging Hume's theories sated even Hume's appetite for
argument.12 From Paris, Hume went to Rheims, where he
worked on the Treatise but also spent a part of "every Day” in
the homes of the best families in town. "[T]hey make Parties
of Diversion to show me more Company," he wrote to a
friend (LDH, I: 22). Seven months alter the publication of
book 3 of the Treatise, William Mure of Caldwell described
Hume as follows.
[H]e is a very sensible fellow...As he is very communica
tive of all his knowledge we have a great deal from him
in the way of dispute and argument...[W]e reason upon
every point with the greatest freedom[;] even his own
books... we canvass with ease, and attack him boldly

12 See Hume's letter to Michael Ramsay of 26 Aug. 1737 in Tadeusz Xozanecki,
“David Hume's Nieznane Listy W Zbiorach Muzeum Czartoryskich (Polska),”
Archiwim Historss Filozofi I Myth Spoterznej 9 (1963): 133; rpt. in Mossner, Life,
626-7 (see also 93-6).
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wherever we can get the least hold of him, and question
and contradict his most favourite notions; all this goes
on with the greatest good humour, and affords us
entertainment.13

The picture of Hume emerging from these biographical facts
accords with what the reviewers of the Treatise saw in the
author. They did not find a voice crying out in the wilderness
so much as an aggressive, cocky debater.14 My own impression
of the author in the Treatise is not predominantly of someone
probing his solipsistic wounds and crying out in solitude; it is
of someone keenly aware at all times of an imaginatively
projected auditor constantly raising objections.
In the Letter to a Physician, however, we do get indications
of psychological distemper. It is a description of a succession
of ailments, perhaps entirely psychosomatic, occurring during
the years in which the Treatise was in gestation and composi
tion. Over the years described in the letter he suffered from
energy loss, scurvy spots on his fingers, excessive expectoration,
heart palpitations, and stomach wind due to a post-adolescent
growth spurt that intensified his appetite. Hume did not
himself link his ailments to dismay over his philosophical
conclusions, but rather to overwork and to a course of
character improvement in which he endeavored to fortify
himself with ’'Reflections against Death, & Poverty, & Shame,
& Pain, & all the other Calamities of Life" [LDH, 1: 14).
Little as they have to do with skepticism, such meditative
exercises could by themselves account for the psychosomatic
ailments. But among the ailments, the energy loss, the “Cold
ness" or loss of “Ardor," is intriguing, for Hume distinguishes
between it and a common depression. Possibly it is related to

Hume said that "I felt no Uneasyness or Want of Spirits,
when I laid aside my Book" and that “Tis a Weakness rather
than a Lowness of Spirits which troubles me, Si there seems
to be as great a Difference betwixt my Distemper Si common
Vapors, as betwixt Vapors & Madness" (1: 13, 17). It consists
simply in a frustrating inability to think through his problems

13 Rpt. in Mossner, Life, 628-9.
14 See the discussion of the reviews in ch. 2, $3 of the present writer's Suasive Art
of David Hume (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), and Mossner, “The
Continental Reception of Hume's Treatue, 1739-1741," Mind 56 (1947): 31-43.
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sufficiently to expound them elegantly and neatly (1: 16-17).
This weakness of spirits occurs only while he is philosophizing
or writing (that is, philosophizing on paper). He found that
he "was not able to follow out any Train of Thought, by one
continued Stretch of View, but by repeated Interruptions, &
by refreshing [his] Eye from Time to Time upon other
Objects" (1: 16). He could make progress only through
intermittent efforts, punctuated with diversions. His practice,
accordingly, evolved so that he “studied moderately, & only
when [he] found [his] Spirits at their highest Pitch, leaving off
before [he] was weary, & trifling away the rest of [his] Time
in the best manner [he] could" (1: 14-15). One is forcibly
reminded here of the neo-Pyrrhonian portion of the Treatise,
in which Hume described a cycle of intense cogitation leading
to skeptical disillusionment, thence to a diversion in which
nature asserts control and restores common sense and good
humor, and then to a renewed engagement in philosophy.
Immediately following the heated description of neo-Pyr
rhonian paralysis quoted earlier from the Treatise, Hume shifts
with stunning abruptness to perfectly tranquil tones:
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable
of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that
purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy
and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by
some avocation, and lively impression of my senses,
which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game
of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my
friends; and when after three or four hour's amusement,
I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold,
and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my
heart to enter into them any farther. (I. iv. 7 / 269)15

The similarity between the diversions described here and the
therapeutic “trifling away" of his time described in the Letter
are too close to be dismissed.

15 With these starkly incongruous consecutive paragraphs in mind, Nuttall infers
that Hume suffered from “a kind of schizophrenia" (Common Sky, 105). It seems
more plausible that the incongruity was deliberate on Hume's pan and that the
effect on readers was supposed to be mild amusement at the author's expense. See
Suasive Art, ch. 2, $4.
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In the Treatise, if not in the Letter, Hume is quite clear that
the cause of his temporary disillusionment with philosophy is
skepticism’s apparent undermining of his confidence in reason.
All the skeptical discussions of causal connection, the external
world, and personal identity relate specifically to his conclusion
that reasoning is premised upon beliefs tnat reason cannot
validate. This is what disturbs Hume, when he is disturbed.
So when in the Letter Hume describes his “Coldness,” one
must wonder whether he is describing the reaction to skep
ticism he describes in the Treatise.
Most telling is the following description of his coldness:
[I]n reducing these [his notes] to Words, when one must
bring the Idea he comprehended in gross, nearer to him,
so as to contemplate its minutest Parts, & keep it steddily
in his Eye, so as to copy these Pans in Order, this I
found impracticable for me, nor were my Spirits equal to
so severe an Employment. (LDH, 1: 16)

In this passage we are at the intersection of Hume’s philosophy
and his literary values: the two are indistinguishable here in
the buttressing of his neo-Attic ideals of order and clarity by
the empirical way of ideas that, theoretically, should have
guaranteed that order and clarity. Like most of his contempo
raries, Hume subscribed to the Lockean notion that referring
questions to their experiential origins in ideas (or impressions,
as Hume would say) should remove the confusing encrustations
of empty words and reveal nakedly as much of truth as
humans are capable of descrying. It is a commonplace of
philosophical history that Hume pushed the way of ideas to
the point of skeptical meltdown. So when Hume speaks of his
inability to contemplate his idea in its minutest pans, very
possibly he is describing the failure of the way of ideas to yield
him clarity and, thence, solutions to his problems. As Hume
said in the Treatise, nature “has sometimes such an influence,
that she can stop our progress, even in the midst of our most
profound reflections, and keep us from running on with all the
consequences of any philosophical opinion" (I. iv. 2 / 214). In
the Letter, therefore, Hume seems to be talking about the stage
of empiricism at which skeptical deadlock occurs, although he
describes the problem there as if the deadlock is due to his
own state of mind rather than his radical empiricism. Even
though in “My Own Life” he attributed the ailments of his
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youth to "ardent Application" (LDH, 1: 1), not to skepticism,
one should be willing to see in the background of the Letter an
empiricism so extreme as to amount to skepticism.
Even ignoring the Letter, one must concede that the
passages in the Ireatise establish that to some extent and at
some time neo-Pyrrhonian skepticism disturbed Hume. But we
can recognize this and still not make le bon David into a
neurasthenic proto-deconstructionist.
Let us sum up the
biographical considerations before moving on to philosophical
ones. Only in one letter among hundreds surviving to us, and
only fitfully at the end of the first book of the Treatise,
Hume's first work, does Hume evince distress over skepticism.
In the Letter what is supposed to be a crise Pyrrhontenne turns
out to be a nervous disorder in which skepticism was only one
component.
It would seem that unless Hume effectively
suppressed his distress for most of his adult life, his distress was
confined to his late adolescence and young adulthood, a time
when, notoriously, people romanticize themselves and aggrand
ize their concerns—especially people in the throes of composi
tion.
The appearances of distress in the Treatise are accurately
described as fitful because, when it does appear, Hume is
careful to notify us that he is expressing the mood of the
moment, “the sentiments of my spleen and indolence,"'16 as he
says. There is no space here to go into the artistic distance
between Hume the reporter of Pyrrhonian distress and Hume
the sufferer of it. Suffice it to say that that distance and the
irony with which he describes his own state of mind effectively
undercut our sense of his suffering. Plainly this is an overflow
of emotion recollected very much in tranquility and with a
sense of humor. Even if we read his literary depictions of
splenetic fits as humorless, the question remains whether Hume
was in his life unusually given to fits or made indecisive by
skepticism. If he was, the fact eluded Adam Smith, who, after
a friendship of at least twenty-four years, wrote that Hume’s
temper "seemed to be more happily balanced than that of any
other man I have ever known.” Smith goes on to speak of
"the firmness of his mind" and "the steadiness of his resolu
tions” (LDH, 2: 452). Boswell, a genuine splenetic devoutly

16

THN. [ iv, 7 / 270;

see. iv. 2 / 217]
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wishing that secretly Hume was disturbed by skepticism, was
unable to report that such was the case.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0
JACK. [after some hesitation] I know nothing. Lady Brack
nell.
LaDY BRACKNELL. I am pleased to hear it. I do not
approve ofanything that tampers with natural ignorance.
—— Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest

Let us now pass on to the philosophical implications for Hume
of his skepticism. If we place the skeptical portions of the
Treatise within their contexts, we End that, except fitfully and
for dramatic purposes, the ultimate point of the discussions is
empiricist and naturalist rather than skeptical. In the introduc
tion Hume described his purpose as constructive, “to explain
the principles of human nature” and on that foundation to
build “a compleat system of the sciences” (xvi). He does not
deplore the limits within which empiricism, and hence mank
ind, must work; rather he believes that his acknowledgement
of them enhances the credibility of his system:
[T]ho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as
universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to
the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest
and fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go beyond
experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover
the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at
first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical. (xvii)
Readers should not and will not worry about these limitations:
“When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of
human reason, we sit down contented; tho’ we be perfectly
satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can
give no reason for our most general and most refined prin
ciples, beside our experience of their reality” (xviii). Some
limit to what the mind can know is intrinsic to empiricism,
according to which what we can ideate about is circumscribed
by what human nature will allow us to experience. Within
these limits, however, we can achieve remarkable things. In
Newton’s hands natural philosophy had made astonishing
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progress within empirical limitations, and Hume thought that
he could make similar advances in the “science of man.” For
example, within the limits of what is experienceable we are not
going to learn much about supernatural entities like God, but
this ignorance poses no genuine problem to mankind. The
trouble arises entirely from people who suppose that they do
know things about God and try to make others know the
same things. On the other hand, within the limits of the
experienceable we can establish, Hume believed, some natural
laws by which the mind works.
This brings us to the second skeptical aspect of his prepond
erantly constructive philosophy. The first, which was intrinsic
to the ideational limitations of empiricism, showed up possibly
in the Letter to a Physician. The second aspect is implicit in
Hume’s naturalism, according to which mental activity is not
a supernatural phenomenon and thence, like everything else in
nature, must follow natural laws. As John Laird said long ago,
the "thesis of Hume’s general philosophy was simply that
'reason’ took its place among other natural forces.”17
There are two points to observe regarding the skeptical
implications of naturalism. The first is that limitation is
implicit in the concept of law. Laws are good things neverthe
less. No one repines that the law of gravity will not be
suspended and the planets fly out of orbit. Likewise it is on
balance good that the mind cannot break the laws of its nature.
If the mind cannot break these laws, it is limited to working
within those laws, but to say that it can work only in a
particular fashion is not to say that it cannot work. Indeed it
is only because of these laws of mind that reasoning can occur.
The limits of mind implicit in Hume’s naturalism are that
certain beliefs are instinctual and ineluctable. They are, as
Norman Kemp Smith termed them, “natural beliefs.”18 For
example, we instinctively believe that the future will be
uniform with the past, that the connections between causes and
effects are objective, and that the world of external bodies is
independent of our perceptions. To prove that these beliefs are
17 Hume‘s Philosophy of Human Nature (London: Methuen, 1932; rpt. [Hamden:]

Archon, 1967), 186. For a helpful comparison of Locke’s and Hume’s views on
the question of the efficacy of reason, see John P. Wright, “Association, Madness,
and the Measures of Probability in Locke and Hume,” Psychology and Literature
in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Christopher Fox (New York: AMS, 1987), 103-27.
18 The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central
Doctrines (London: Macmillan, 1941).
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ineluctable features of human nature, Hume shows not only
that we do not have a rational foundation for them, but that
we could not find such a foundation. They are and must
remain instinctive. Hence skeptical arguments are useful in
showing that cognition is determined by causal laws. If the
mind were not determined to hold certain indispensable beliefs,
reason would lead us to skeptical suspension or belief in them.
The fact that nature will not let us suspend belief for very
long, if at all, means that nature is the driving force behind this
category of belief. Nature wins over philosophy, fortunately
for us since otherwise philosophy would paralyze us. As
Hume says in the first Enquiry about our instinctive inductive
expectations,

this operation of the mind.. is so essential to the subsist
ence of all human creatures, it is not probable, that it
could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our
reason, which is slow in operations; appears not, in any
degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is,
in every age and period of human life, extremely liable
to error and mistake. It is more conformable to the
ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act
of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency,
which...may be independent of all the laboured deduc
tions of the understanding, (v. 2 / 55)

To understand Hume's valuation of instinct as against reason,
one simply has to imagine having to calculate the probability
that the ground would remain solid every time one wished to
take a step.
Once we look beyond the few moments in the Treatise in
which Hume depicts himself as venting his spleen, we find that
the ultimate point behind the skeptical passages is invariably
a thesis of cognitive naturalism, not one of neo-Pyrrhonism.
Naturally, not ratiocinatively, the mind holds certain indispens
able beliefs. This will seem less shocking if we consider the
alternatives as they would appear to Hume. If the mind were
not natural and did not follow laws like “Thou shall believe in
external objects," it would not, as a purely ratiocinative entity,
operate upon any unvalidated premises and must therefore
either validate all the premises beneath all premises in infinitum
or it must find some one bedrock validatable premise from
which all other premises and all knowledge can be ratioci-
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natively educed. On the face of it this seems less likely than
the tenet that cognitions are causal events following natural
laws and operating on the basis of a few instinctively held
premises.
What is the point behind his skeptical argument that even
mathematical certainty degenerates under rational scrutiny into
probability, which itself degenerates likewise in infinitum? His
point, he says, is to show that since such suspension of belief
never occurs, we must not be purely rational beings and that
"Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has
determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel.” "‘Tis
happy,” he says, "that nature breaks the force of all skeptical
arguments in time, and keeps them from having any con
siderable influence on the understanding” (THN, [. iv. 1 / 183,
187). Just so with the belief in the independent existence of
the external world: "Nature has not left this to his [a skep
tic's] choice, and has doubtless esteem'd it an affair of too great
importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and
speculations" (iv. 2 / 187). Hume registers reservations about
this skeptical aspect of naturalism only in places in which he
is depicting a momentary fit of spleen, something like what he
described in the Letter to a Physician. These fits make lively
reading, and doubtless they represent some genuine reservations
that Hume held at some times, but they are the slightest
fraction of one book of the Treatise. Generally speaking,
Hume celebrates nature’s victory over philosophical doubt.
Usually we can see why there is anything to celebrate by
asking what would appear to Hume to be the case if his
skeptical arguments were wrong. In the appendix to the
Treatise he argues, supposedly to his own confusion, that belief
consists simply in vivacity of conception.19 But he does not
lament this conclusion. He is intent on proving it correct.
From his point of view, conditions would be worse if he were
incorrect.
The fact that belief consists of conceptual vivacity is no
cause for alarm so long as one way of enhancing vivacity is
strong argument. People often do believe things for other than

19 Richard Walton also adduced the theory of belief as reiterated in the appendix
as indicating a crise Pyrrhontenne (see n8). Walton is inspired by Richard Popkin,
whose views appeared in some important articles usefully collected in hit The High
Road to Pynhonism, ed. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Diego:
Austin, 1980).
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rationally satisfactory reasons, but if Hume’s theory accounts
for the regrettable fact, he had no reason to be more upset
about it than before he formulated his theory. It had always
been plain that conviction arising from due consideration is
only one way in which belief is attained. That belief consists
of vivacity is to Hume simply the way things are, and lament
ing it would be bootless, but in fact ne indicates that the fact
is not lamentable.

The mind has the command over all its ideas, and can
separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases; so that
if belief consisted merely in a new idea, annex’d to the
conception, it wou’d be in a man’s power to believe what
he pleas’d. We may, therefore, conclude, that belief
consists merely...in something, that depends not on the
will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and
principles, of which we are not masters. When we are
convinc’d of any matter of fact, we do nothing but
conceive it, along with a certain feeling, different from
what attends the mere reveries of the imagination. And
when we express our incredulity concerning any fact, we
mean, that the arguments for the fact produce not that
feeling, (app., 623-4)

The converse must also be true: when we express our assent
to a proposition, the arguments do produce a belief-compelling
feeling. Hume continues, "Did not the belief consist in a
sentiment different from our mere conception, whatever
objects were presented by the wildest imagination, wou'd be on
an equal footing with the most establish'd truths founded on
history and experience” (624). Of the two alternatives, Hume’s
is the one that accounts for the familiar experience of being
forced to face facts. Either belief is itself an idea annexed to
the idea in which we believe, or belief is the force with which
the believed idea presents itself to the mind. The first is
implausible and undesirable because, if belief is an idea, our
control over our ideas would allow us to control our beliefs.
It happens that we cannot control our beliefs, and that is a
good thing. Experience and memory exert a salutary pressure
on our psyches, preventing us, normally, from deluding
ourselves indefinitely. Although I can manipulate my ideas of
horses and men, creating an idea of a centaur, I cannot make
myself believe in a centaur’s biological existence. Moreover,
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we can present arguments forceful enough to make unwilling
people believe things despite their control over their ideas. All
this is highly desirable. Human capacity for self delusion is
strong enough; happily it is not complete. Hume thinks that
the involuntary determination of conceptual vivacity prevents
cognitive chaos and works against madness, not vice versa.
I said that there were two points to observe regarding the
skeptical implications of naturalism, the first being that the
concept of natural law, like that of any other law, entails
limitation. If reasoning is a natural phenomenon and follows
natural laws, it is constrained by those laws; but in another
sense, of which Hume was duly appreciative, reasoning is made
functional by those laws. The second point to observe is that
Hume's tenet of the compatibility of free will with determin
ism would make the willed functioning of reason at least
appear compatible with its resting upon a base of instinctive
beliefs. Reason, properly understood, would no more be
compromised than free will.
Admittedly, that Hume thought along these lines is difficult
to document. Although he set forth in detail why will is
compatible with determinism, he did not take the next step
and explain in print that, consequently, freely willed acts of
reasoning are compatible with their being partly determined by
instincts. Whereas there are the notorious passages in the
Treatise in which he frets over the status of reason vis-a-vis
instinct,20 one has to infer a Humean solution to the problem
by relating Hume's naturalistic account of reasoning to his

,20 For which. see THN, □. iii 1-3, and EHU, vui 1-2. Compatibilism has long
since gained respectability As Donald Davidson said. "Hobbes, Locke, Hume.
Moore. Schtick, Ayer, Stevenson, and a host of others have done what can be
done, or ought ever to have been needed, to remove the confusions that can make
determinism seem to frustrate freedom" ("Freedom to Act," Essays on Actions and
Events [rpt Oxford: Clarendon. 1982], 63)
An entertaining account of the
compatibility of unconscious impulse with conscious reasoning is Daniel Dennett.
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge: MIT Press.
1984), ch. 2.
[ii ch. 1, $], Dennett makes fun of anxiety over cognitive
determinism. A detailed account of determinism with express Humean abilities
is Ted Honderich, A Theory of Determinism. The Mind, Neuroscience, and Life
Hopes (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1988].
Ch. 8, J1 is a concise survey of the
controversy over compatibilism, starting with Aristotle, proceeding through
Hume, and ending with Dennett.
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compatibilism. But the implications of these two tenets could
hardly have escaped him.21
“Our reason must be consider’d as a kind of cause,” says
Hume, “of which truth is the natural effect; but such-a-one as
by the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our
mental powers, may frequently be prevented" (THN, 1. iv. 1 /
180). Here reasoning is placed within the web of crisscrossing
arrows of causal sequences that comprise the world of natural
phenomena. Frequently, though not infallibly, a cause, namely
reason, brings into being an effect of a cognitive state that with
some propriety may be called knowledge (that is, a state of
mind in which available evidence is accounted for to the extent
that human limitations allow). Trace the causal arrow back
along any such sequence to the cause of this cause of knowledge and, according to Hume, we will find a freely willed
choice to undertake the act of reasoning. Moving yet another
step back to the cause of the choice to reason, we find that the
choice was prompted by a causal complex of character (perhaps
a disposition to be reasonable or to be curious), motives
(perhaps fear of the consequences of being mistaken about
some matter of fact), and circumstances. That a choice is
determined by the chooser’s character in reaction with other
factors does not alter its being a choice, so free will is com
patible with causal determinism.
Now if we focus in on one step in this sequence, that of
reasoning itself, it too is revealed to be comprised of a sequence
of causal steps in a causal complex. This psychic complex,
according to Hume, would include raw sensory data processed
instinctively according to laws such as “Believe that your
perceptions exist continuously and independently of your
sentience” and “Believe that the future will resemble the past.”
Such laws determine what reason is; but reason, such as it is
now revealed to be, is still reason, just as free will remains free
will despite our realization that what one wills is determined
by the sort of person one is. The role of our characters in our
choices is analogous to that of our natural beliefs in our
reasoning. Just as given the sort of person one is, one will
choose this rather than that, given the instinctually based
nature of reason, reason will function certain ways and not

21 They did not escape Tom Beauchamp and Alexander Rotenberg. See their
Hume and the Problem of Carnation (New York: Oxford University Preu, 1981),
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others. That choice and reason are causally conditioned has
been disturbing to some philosophers, but by no means to all.
Whether or not Hume should have been disturbed by this
tenet, it would have been very possible for him, like many
others since, to accept, with occasional reservations, the
instinctual basis of reason.
Once again, reason determined by certain salutary instincts
can still be effective. That is, it can be a cause that brings into
being the effect of knowledge. Even conceding, as certainly
Hume would, that this instinctually determined reason is not
as reliably effective as is desirable, he would still have to
consider the rationalist alternative in which nature does not
prevail over philosophy. If the natural process did not take
place and reason had instead to validate all of its steps and all
of its premises in infinitum, reasoning could never result in
conviction. Instead it would result in the effects of suspension
of belief, anomie, and, eventually, death (see EHU, xii. 2 /
160). Hume has less reason to be appalled by the implications
of naturalism for reason than he would have by those of the
rationalist alternative, which, were it veridical, would be
disastrous for reason.
The question of how disturbed Hume was by his own
skepticism is a genuine one. Its answer is not obvious, and
questions of degree are highly unmanageable. The present goal
has not been to expose error, but only to moderate a tendency.
Those who see Hume as traumatized react to real evidence that
is conspicuous and hard to ignore. But they do ignore the
preponderance of the evidence, which unconspicuously indi
cates that Hume was not terribly troubled. Proportionately
very little in his works indicates philosophical distress.
Proportionately very little biographical evidence indicates that
he was uncomfortable with his philosophy. From a Humean
perspective, the puissance of skepticism can be seen as confirm
ing rather than subverting empiricism and naturalism. And if
we take Hume seriously when he explained his view of
Pyrrhonian deadlock, it would in fact have been impossible for
him to be disturbed without his state of mind’s being in plain
contradiction of his own tenets.
Explaining that a suspension of belief is little to be dreaded,
he wrote reassuringly that
[A] Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will
have any constant influence on the mind. [S]o fatal an
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event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too
strong for principle. And though a Tyrrhenian may
throw himself or others into a momentary amazement
and confusion by his profound reasonings, the first and
most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts
and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of
action and speculation, with the philosophers of every
other sect, or with those who never concerned them
selves in any philosophical researches. (EHU, xii. 2 /
160)

The point is that Tyrrhenian consternation cannot last for any
considerable length of time. Skeptical arguments can result in
only "momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion"
(xii. 1 / 155 n.). The reason, Hume explains in several places,
is that the mind is so framed that naturally it cannot sustain a
firm grasp of extended subtle reasonings, such as a train of
skeptical doubts leading putatively to suspension of belief:
“[T]he conviction, which arises from a subtile reasoning,
diminishes in proponion to the efforts, which the imagination
makes to enter into the reasoning, and to conceive it in all its
parts. Belief, being a lively conception, can never be entire,
where it is not founded on something natural and easy."22 And
what we cannot grasp firmly and believe strongly cannot affect
us viscerally:
A consideration...which we enter into with difficulty,
which we cannot retain without care and attention, will
never produce those genuine and durable movements of
passion, which are the result of nature, and the constitu
tion of the mind ..The air is too fine to breathe in, where
it is above the winds and clouds of the atmosphere. 23

Putting together Hume's theory of belief, then, we get a
natural balance, which our own personal experience will
confirm, in which ratiocination enhances vivacity and belief
until it becomes wiredrawn, the point at which the danger of
going awry increases. As the extremity of reason, Pyrrhonism

THN, [. iv. I / 186; see. iii. 13 / 144.
23The Sceptic," Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller
(Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), 172. I must thank Joe Dupras for helpfully

22

commenting upon a draft of this article.
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is as wiredrawn as anything can be. Presumably Hume judged
from his own experience, like a good empiricist, when he
found that Pyrrhonian disturbances are necessarily ephemeral.
Is it plausible to suppose that Hume was profoundly disturbed
by his skepticism and then, in the face of this personal ex
perience, formulated a theory about how skepticism could not
disturb us appreciably? It seems more likely that he formu
lated this theory upon the basis of his experience that, happily,
nature will not let philosophy lead us catastrophically wrong.

